Psychological change is difficult to assess, in part because self-reported beliefs and attitudes may be biased or distorted. The present study probed belief change by using the hindsight bias to counter another bias that plagues assessment of subjective change -here, in an educational context. Although research indicates that skepticism courses reduce paranormal beliefs, the findings may reflect demand characteristics (biases toward desired, skeptical responses). Our hindsight-bias procedure circumvented demand by asking students, following semester-long skepticism (and control) courses, to recall their pre-course levels of paranormal belief. People typically remember themselves as previously thinking, believing, and acting as they do now, so current skepticism should provoke false recollections of previous skepticism. Thus, given true belief change, skepticism students should remember themselves as having been more skeptical than they were. They did, at least about paranormal topics that were covered most extensively in the course. Our findings thus show hindsight to be useful in evaluating cognitive change, beyond demand characteristics.
Unfortunately, this literature is limited by both size and methodological rigor. Of the dozen or so published studies on educational interventions and paranormal belief, only three included control groups (students in unrelated courses; see Dougherty, 2004; Gray, 1985; Morier & Keeports, 1994) 1 ; furthermore, some studies included only post-course evaluations with no pre-to-post comparisons (Broch, 2000; Calvin, 2009 ) and most studies asked students to report their beliefs without anonymity (Banziger, 1983; Emme, 1940; Gilliland, 1930; Jones & Zusne, 1981; McBurney, 1976; Swords, 1990; Tobacyk, 1983) . Most reports of education-induced paranormal-belief change may thus have derived simply from passing time (or other external influences) or from students' reacting to their identifiabilty. These are significant and rather obvious interpretive obstacles. However, even studies comparing paranormal-skepticism courses to controls, with anonymous belief reporting, likely suffered from an additional problem, demand characteristics (Orne, 1962) : Students may simply have provided the instructor-asinvestigator with the obviously desired responses (i.e., that they are now more skeptical of the paranormal than they were before). Of course, such demand characteristics may contaminate the assessment of any experimental, educational, or clinical interventions designed to change subjective outcomes (e.g., Laney et al., 2008) . But is there a compelling way around them?
Debiasing via Hindsight Bias
The present study harnessed a much-studied cognitive bias -hindsight -as a novel means to circumvent demand characteristics in self-reported psychological change. Laboratory investigations of the hindsight bias typically ask subjects to predict event outcomes, or answer trivia questions, before providing them with the actual outcomes or answers (Fischhoff, 1975 ; for a review, see Hawkins & Hastie, 1990) . Hindsight bias occurs when outcome knowledge colors subjects' subsequent reports (and, ostensibly, beliefs) about their initial state of knowledge, such that they "knew it all along" (Hasher, Attig, & Alba, 1981) . Most relevant to the present work, hindsight is also demonstrated beyond the cognitive-psychology laboratory, where people's current attitudes and beliefs bias their recollections of their own personal past, in a form of false memory (Ross, 1989) ; e.g., when adults recall their adolescent political attitudes and beliefs, previous emotions, or substance use, their recollections are strongly influenced (and sometimes, most strongly influenced) by their current attitudes, beliefs, emotions, and behaviors rather than their actual past attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Collins, Graham, Hansen, & Johnson, 1982; Field, Thompson, & Gallagher-Thompson, 2006; G. Markus, 1986) . This holds even following a challenge to one's beliefs, such as writing a counter-attitudinal essay: Students who chose to write an essay arguing against their belief that students should have considerable control over the courses taught at their university subsequently mis-remembered themselves as having previously held that belief much less strongly (Bem & McConnell, 1970) . It seems, then, that adults generally hold implicit theories of belief and trait stability, even in the face of potentially changeinducing events, and so when they recall their past actions and opinions they are unduly influenced by their psychological present (Ross, 1989) . Thus, for example, if I am skeptical of the paranormal now, then I am likely to remember myself -rightly or wrongly -as having been similarly skeptical in the past.
To exploit such hindsight systematically, we anonymously probed university students' paranormal beliefs, preceding and following a semester-long skepticism course, versus control courses, in two ways. Half of each class reported their current beliefs at both times (the typical, demand-vulnerable procedure); the other half reported their current beliefs at time 1 but tried to reproduce exactly their time-1 responses at time 2 from memory (the "hindsight" procedure). Given actual belief change (toward non-belief), skepticism students should report their time-2, current paranormal beliefs to be weaker than at time 1, and weaker than those of time-2 controls. Moreover -and critically -with the hindsight procedure, they (but not controls) should recall themselves being more skeptical at time 1 than they actually had been.
METHOD
We compared pre-to post-course paranormal beliefs in both skepticism courses (precourse N = 340) and control courses (pre-course N = 238). The semester-long skepticism course (PSY 318; Belief in "Weird" Things) was taught over three different semesters by the first author at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG), a comprehensive state university in the Southeastern U.S., with an introductory psychology prerequisite (syllabi: http://www.uncg. edu/~mjkane/ memlab.html). Through lectures, readings, videos, and demonstrations (from classic memory experiments to mentalist magic tricks), it focused on the philosophy and methods of science, the idea and perils of naïve realism, various cognitive biases and illusions that may create and sustain false beliefs, and the empirical evidence (pro and con) regarding many paranormal and pseudoscientific phenomena. The instructor repeatedly made clear that students were not graded on the basis of their beliefs and that they would never be asked to reveal their beliefs in the course context, beyond two anonymous surveys.
Control classes were three semester-long UNCG psychology courses with identical prerequisites, each taught by a different instructor (including one by the third author); they were survey courses in Developmental Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, and Sex, Gender, and Behavior. Skepticism and control classes had equivalent subject-retention rates between time 1 (pre-course) and time 2 (post course; 56% and 57%, respectively). Lost data reflected course withdrawals, isolated absences from class when questionnaires were administered, or students' failure to use the same identity-protecting PIN code on both pre-and post-course questionnaires.
We collected belief-report measures from skepticism courses at the very beginning of the first and last classes, and from control courses sometime during the first and last 1.5 weeks of the semester. At time 1, all students responded according to their current beliefs. At time 2, we color-coded belief measures and distributed them pseudo-randomly from a shuffled pile (by seating); students who received questionnaires in one color reported their current beliefs (the typical procedure) and in the other color by recollecting their time-1 belief reports (the hindsight procedure). To emphasize to hindsight-questionnaire students that we wanted them to accurately recall their prior beliefs in an unbiased way (i.e., to create an "experimental demand" for memory accuracy; Bem & McConnell, 1970; Fischhoff, 1977) , we wrote these instructions on the questionnaires, and reinforced them orally: "Please read each statement and try to recall how strongly you either believed or disbelieved in it the last time you completed this questionnaire, by circling a number from 1 -7. We do not want you to respond according to your current beliefs, but rather according to your beliefs before you took this course…" (all emphases in the original). Students created PIN codes for their time-1 and time-2 measures to allow anonymous linking of individual students' pre-and post-course responses. We collected no demographic information in order to satisfy IRB concerns about student anonymity, given that the subjects were also the investigator's students.
The belief-report measure presented 52 items representing seven categories: Psychics/ESP, Alternative-medicine/healing, Superstitions/Omens, UFOs/Alien-abduction, Astrology, Creationism, and Judeo-Christian/Biblical (for the complete measure, see http:// www.uncg.edu/~mjkane/memlab.html). Judeo-Christian beliefs, aside from Creationism, were not addressed in the course materials but acted as a control category. For all items, students rated their belief on 1 -7 scales anchored by 1 ("strongly disbelieve"), 4 ("unsure"), and 7 ("strongly believe"). Principal-components analysis (oblimin rotation) on all time-1 data (N = 578) yielded seven components with eigenvalues > 1. To simplify the data and best represent the skepticismcourse topics, we selected the five or six highest-loading items from each component, after splitting one component into separate Judeo-Christian and Creationism categories (because only the latter reflected course material), and combining a single-item Meditation component with the related Alternative Medicine/Healing component (see Table 1 ); we then averaged the 5 -6 item scores for each belief category, for each student (after reverse scoring any items with negative component loadings), and analyzed those mean category scores.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We analyzed belief-change data from only students who completed both time-1 and time-2 measures (Ns = 190 and 136, in skepticism and control courses, respectively). Critically, the belief categories we derived from the questionnaire were reliably measured: Spearman-Brown test-retest reliabilities for each belief category, based on control students who completed currentbelief measures at both time-points (and so who received no intervention or hindsight manipulation; N = 72) ranged from .89 -.97.
A significant 4-way interaction among Course (Skepticism vs. Control), Time (Pre vs. Post), Post-Course Questionnaire Procedure (Current beliefs vs. Hindsight), and Belief Category, F(6,1932) = 3.83, MSE = 0.32, p = .001, η p 2 = .01, led us to examine each assessment procedure and category separately. In reporting their current beliefs (see Figure 1A) , students in the skepticism course showed significantly greater pre-to-post decreases than controls in only some of the categories; indeed, the Course × Time × Belief Category interaction was significant, F(6,1014) = 12.15, MSE = 0.33, p < .001, η p 2 = .07. Except for Judeo-Christian and Creationism beliefs, all belief categories showed greater decreases for skepticism-course students than for controls [for these Course × Time interactions: Fs(1,169) = 12.12 -72.62; ps ≤ .001; η p 2 = .07 -.30]. Non-creationist Biblical beliefs were not addressed in course materials and creationist beliefs were expected to be difficult to change, particularly in the "Bible Belt" of the Southeastern U.S.
It was clear, however, that for phenomena related to psychics and ESP, alternative healing, alien spacecraft and abductions, astrology, and superstitious omens, students in the skepticism course reported themselves to be much more skeptical of the paranormal and pseudoscience following the course than before, and more skeptical than were students in the control courses. Moreover, these significant effects came in the context of skepticism-and control-course students reporting statistically identical beliefs on the pre-course measures: The overall main effect of Course at time 1 was non-significant, F(1,169) = 1.22, MSE = 4.48, p > .27, and for each of the 5 belief categories showing a Course × Time interaction above, all main effects of Course at time 1 yielded non-significant differences, Fs(1,169) < 1.16, ps > .28. Skepticism-and control-course outcome differences, therefore, were not driven by selection biases.
For students completing the hindsight measure ( Figure 1B) , who attempted to recall their time-1 responses at time 2, the Course × Time × Belief Category interaction was, again, significant, F(6,918) = 5.84, MSE = 0.31, p < .001, η p 2 = .04. Of most importance, for Psychics/ESP and Alternative-medicine/health beliefs, the topics covered most intensely by the skepticism course (see below), skepticism-course students were more likely than controls to remember themselves as more skeptical before the course than they had been: Course × Time interactions, Fs(1,153) = 6.20 and 23.83, for Psychic/ESP and Alternative medicine/health, respectively; ps ≤ .014; η p 2 = .04 and .14, respectively. Whereas skepticism-and control-course students reported statistically equivalent Psychic/ESP and Alternative-medicine/health beliefs before the courses began [for Psychic, F(1,153) < 1; for Alternative-medicine, F(1,153) = 2.34, MSE = 0.94, p = .13], skepticism-course students, post-course, recalled themselves as having been more skeptical than did control students [for Psychic, F(1,153) = 4.81, MSE = 1.85, p < .05, η p 2 = .03; for Alternative-medicine, F(1,153) = 5.69, MSE = 0.99, p < .05, η p 2 = .04]. Note that these patterns reflected more than just regression to the mean: skepticism-course students' time-2 recollections for both Psychic and Alternative-medicine categories were further from the scale midpoint, and further from the time-1 and time-2 control-group recollections, than were their time-1 belief reports.
Above we claimed that Psychic/ESP and Alternative medicine/health beliefs changed more than did other paranormal topics due to a systematic treatment effect, i.e., a "doseresponse" relation. Whereas approximately 8 skepticism-class periods (roughly 10 hours) were dedicated to Psychic/ESP and Alternative medicine/health topics combined, only 4.5 class periods (5.6 hours) we devoted to Superstitions/Omens, UFOs/Alien-abduction, and Astrology topics combined. Moreover, to the extent that video materials and live demonstrations increase the vividness, memorability, and long-term impact of messages (e.g., Reyes, Thompson, & Bower, 1980; Ruscio, 2000) , we offer that, across different semesters, Psychic/ESP and Alternative medicine/health topics were supplemented by 18 -23 video segments (ranging from 4 -60 min each) and 5 demonstrations (from 5 -60 min each), whereas Superstitions/Omens, UFOs/Alien-abduction, and Astrology topics were supplemented by only 2 -3 videos (ranging from 3 -60 min each) and only 2 demonstrations (from 5 -10 min each). Thus, the two paranormal topic areas that demonstrated significant hindsight-bias effects (and the largest effects on the current-belief questionnaire, too) accounted for almost twice as much class time, and almost five times as many video/ demonstration activities, as did the three paranormal topics that showed no hindsight bias; there may be an analogy, here, to laboratory studies that find hindsight biases to increase with greater frequency of the "outcome" information (e.g., Wood, 1978) .
The evidence strongly suggests that the skepticism course effected real and substantial belief change. Not only did skepticism-course students report themselves to be currently less credulous regarding paranormal claims following the course, but they also recalled themselves as having been more skeptical before the course than they had actually been, at least in two primary topic domains. We might have reason to be skeptical, ourselves, of the former, current-belief reports, as they may partially reflect demand characteristics.
3 The hindsight-bias procedure, however, tapped into subjects' beliefs in a way that circumvented demand. Not only does basic laboratory research on hindsight indicate minimal social-desirability or motivational influence (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990) , but here it is unlikely that any particular social demand would have led students to feign or exaggerate their prior skepticism in only two paranormal domains on the hindsight questionnaires while endorsing skepticism in all five (non-Biblical) paranormal domains on the current-belief questionnaire.
In fact, previous research suggests that demand characteristics in our hindsight procedure would have yielded the opposite results (see Ross, 1989) . In intervention contexts that lead participants to expect change (study-skills courses; pain-treatment programs), but little objective change actually occurs, people retrospectively adjust their personal recollections "downward" in order to appear more changed (e.g., they recall their initial study skills, or initial pain levels, as having been worse than they actually were; Conway & Ross, 1984; Linton & Melin, 1982) . Most relevant to present concerns, such downward adjustments can also appear in people's recollections of past attitudes, as well: Subordinates whose supervisors completed a management-training course showed no objective pre-to-post change in their attitudes about work (commitment to the team, sense of direction), but after their boss's course they remembered themselves as having originally had worse attitudes than they reported at the time (Taylor, Russ-Eft, & Taylor, 2009 ). In the context of the present study, then, any such demandinduced biases should have lead our skepticism-course students to support their (unfounded) expectation of a change toward skepticism by recalling themselves as having been more credulous than they had actually been, rather than more skeptical than they had been.
CONCLUSIONS
Our study exploited the hindsight bias to show that, for several deeply covered topics, educational interventions reduce paranormal beliefs beyond the effects of demand characteristics. Of broader significance, the findings indicate that any intervention program that creates and measures psychological change may circumvent demand effects by harnessing hindsight: People who truly change may misremember themselves as having been just as they are now. Indeed, regarding the pseudoscientific claims of psychics and alternative healers, our skepticism-course students believed they'd "pooh-poohed it all along." FOOTNOTES 1. Only some of the samples from Dougherty (2004) and Gray (1985) were compared to controls; Wesp and Montgomery (1988) compared skepticism-course students to controls in thinking skills, but they did not evaluate students' beliefs.
2. Because the Alternative medicine/health composite measure included two items with fairly low factor loadings (see Table 1 ), we re-ran the relevant ANOVAs using a second composite that included only the three high-loading items. This second, 3-item composite yielded slightly lower mean endorsement ratings than those we report for the full, 5-item composite, but the statistical patterns (all main effects and interactions) were unchanged.
3. Of course, with the current-belief procedure there is simply no way to determine exactly how much influence demand characteristics might be having on subjects' responses (this is what motivated our use of the hindsight procedure, after all). At the same time, we do not believe that students' reports of their current beliefs were driven entirely by demand characteristics, because they reported belief change selectively. Note that skepticism students did not report being less believing of Creationism claims at the end of the course, despite significant lecture and reading material being devoted to discussing Creationism as a pseudoscientific system. If demand was overwhelmingly responsible for students' belief reports, they would have indicated significant belief change in Creationism. 
